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Abstract—Privacy enhancing technologies become increasingly 
necessary as more and more personal data is collected. 
Especially, as nowadays everybody is permanently online using 
different applications and devices, users are often lacking the 
means to effectively control the access to their private data. 
Existing approaches provide only isolated solutions for one 
device and are limited in functionality to control data access. 
Moreover, existing solutions may not be legally compliant and 
lack usability, especially for non-experts. Therefore, we present 
an interdisciplinary approach to manage and distribute privacy 
settings: PRIVACY-AVARE is intended to enable users to 
centrally determine their data protection preferences and to 
apply them globally on different devices (mobiles, tablets, smart 
homes, cars, ...). In this paper, we present PRIVACY-AVARE 
by first introducing and discussing main functional and non-
functional requirements with a special focus on compliance and 
usability requirements. Based on this discussion, we then 
develop a conceptual solution. Finally, we discuss the limitations 
of our approach and give an outlook. 
Keywords-data protection; mobile apps; privacy enhancing 
technologies; data sovereignty; usability; legal conformity 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Everyday life is increasingly characterized by globally 
connected ubiquitous Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). Especially the ubiquitous internet means 
that citizens and things (like a smart TV) are permanently 
online, which results in a considerable change of social and 
business life as well as communication in general. 
Smartphones, digital social networks, commercial rebate 
systems, cloud applications and ubiquitous computing lead to 
an increasing value of personal information. This information 
is collected, stored, evaluated and exploited, partly without the 
user being aware of it although European data protection 
provisions require an adequate level of transparency [1, S. 
121]. In contrast to legal obligations like minimizing the data 
collection, many apps are “overprivileged”, that is, require 
more privileges than they actually need [2], [3]. In addition, 
advertising libraries, which are often integrated into free apps 
to generate revenue, are a potential privacy risk: they receive 
the same permissions as the apps they are integrated into, but 
they might use them to provide detailed user profiles [4]. 
Regardless of advertising libraries, it is not always necessary, 
that users are clearly identifiable via IDs (for instance, in case 
of iOS the Unique Device Identifier), but many applications 
use this information and transfer it only partially encrypted to 
the respective provider [5]. If users disclose also third persons' 
personal information (like contact information) without their 
consent, they can be held liable for data protection 
infringement [6]. In this complex scenario, users can hardly 
protect their privacy, especially given the fact that they must 
solve this problem for different devices. Therefore, it is 
important to help users protecting their personal data through 
privacy enhancing technologies. However, researchers face a 
so called privacy paradox: users often express their concerns 
on phenomena like Big Data or Internet of Things and the 
desire for enhancing privacy on the one hand but 
simultaneously use privacy infringing applications or services 
without applying privacy protecting solutions on the other 
hand [7]. There are several approaches to explain this paradox, 
like the users' missing awareness of privacy risks due to a lack 
of proper information [8]. Another reason could come from 
aspects like availability of privacy preserving solutions and 
effort or expenses involved [9]. Additionally, network effects 
determine which network a citizen uses. That is why more 
privacy sensitive alternatives to WhatsApp like e.g. Threema 
cannot get a big market share if they enter the market after the 
big player [10]. Therefore, legal conformity, technical 
functionality and usability could be the key factors for the 
success of a privacy enhancing solution.  
Thus, the question is how to enable a user-friendly 
restriction of the exposure of personal user data, while 
allowing users to still benefit from the full range of useful 
applications – often only offered for free in “exchange” for 
personal data. In Europe, the upcoming General Data 
Protection Regulation empowers the citizens' self-
determination and obliges app providers to use data 
minimizing default settings. These obligations also apply to 
international companies outside the EU, if they offer goods 
and services to people located within the EU or monitor their 
behaviour. If app providers violate these obligations, technical 
control and enforcement mechanisms can support users to 
claim their right to data protection, but might cause legal 
infringements with regard to copyright, civil, criminal or 
public law. If users risk legal consequences they might feel 
deterred from using privacy solutions. Moreover, in order to 
limit complexity and involved effort, users should be able to 
centrally define privacy settings in accordance to their 
individual preferences once, which then are distributed and 
enforced on (all) devices of the user. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: In the next section 
(Access Right Management), we discuss existing possibilities 
for users to control access to their private data with respect to 
functionality, legal compliance and usability. Our analysis is 
focused on Android for mobile devices as Android has the 
biggest market share and is open source [11]. However, the 
principles apply to any modern operating system. The results 
of this analysis form the basis for a set of basic requirements 
for a distributed privacy enhancing system. The requirements 
are presented in the following section (Requirements 
Analysis). Then, we describe in section PRIVACY-AVARE 
our concept for distributed data access control. The main 
contribution of our concept is the combined consideration of 
technical, legal and usability concerns. In order to evaluate our 
approach we discuss our conceptual solution with respect to 
the initial requirements in the section discussion. Finally, we 
provide a summary and outlook for future work, including a 
prototypical implementation of our system for Android 
devices. 
 
II. ACCESS RIGHT MANAGEMENT 
A prerequisite for any approach to enhance privacy is the 
technical possibility for the users to control access to their 
private data. For example, to manage privacy settings, both 
iOS and Android implement an authorization system. In 
order to be able to access certain personal data such as 
appointments or contacts, an application must apply for this 
authorization. Some permissions are then granted 
automatically by the operating system, others can be given by 
the user at runtime (iOS and Android version 6 or later) or 
during installation (Android). Additionally, Android draws a 
distinction between "normal" and "dangerous" permissions. 
Setting the time zone would be an example of a normal 
authorization, while access to contact information is 
classified as dangerous [12]. However, this predefined 
classification must be considered critically, since, for 
example, access to the Internet is one of the "normal" 
authorizations. This entitlement is questionable for data 
protection since collected personal data can easily be passed 
on to third parties over the internet connection. 
Different authors have proposed approaches to improve the 
existing access rights management implementations for iOS 
and Android in terms of usability and functionality (that is, 
cognitive and technical empowerment of the user to 
effectively control data access). These include, for example, 
the identification and visualization of data outflows [13], the 
provision of substitute data (shadow data) on access, and the 
blockade of accesses [14]. Furthermore, in order to allow 
better data protection decisions by the users, the justification 
of requests of authorizations is suggested [15]. Another 
significant point are fine-grained permissions [16] when 
protecting privacy on any device. It is important to provide 
the possibility for fine-grained and unambiguous privacy 
settings. 
A. Existing Solutions 
As one can see from the discussion above, there is a need 
to enhance and improve upon the built-in access rights 
management solutions for mobile devices. And indeed, there 
are already several applications available to manage the 
privacy settings. They all have in common, that they try to 
improve the existing mechanisms to either allow more fine-
grained control or better usability. Three kinds of approaches 
do exist from a technical viewpoint: 
1. Remove authorizations via the modification of the 
manifest file (e.g. Advanced Permission Manager) 
2. Add a security library (e.g. SRT AppGuard ) 
3. Make a modification at the operation system level 
(e.g. XPrivacy ) 
Fig. 1 shows these three approaches, visualizing 
modifications of the (source) code in dark blue. These 
modifications possibly provoking compliance considerations 
are discussed below. The latter two solutions use sandboxes. 
A sandbox is referred to as environment, which restricts 
actions by an application according to defined rules [17]. By 
an access restriction the risk of a violation of the defined rules 
is reduced [18]. This concept, derived from IT security, was 
adapted to data protection, e.g. by [19]. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Different mechanisms for right management 
We have published an overview of our analysis on existing 
solutions regarding access management for user support [20], 
including a comprehensive assessment concerning usability 
and functionality aspects. In the following, we discuss 
identified drawbacks concerning relevant aspects of 
functionality, compliance and usability. 
B. Limitations of existing solutions 
Functionality 
If monitored applications stop working in case of blocking 
data access, users might feel compelled to unblock and give 
up privacy protection. Therefore, possibilities to reveal only a 
selected part of information (e.g., only several contacts or only 
telephone numbers hiding further information) or provide 
substitute data are essential functionalities. Currently, only a 
few solutions grant these options e.g. PDroid or MoboClean 
(partially) [21]. 
In case of code modifications the possibility to update 
monitored apps might be impaired [22]. Furthermore, most 
solutions require users to adjust privacy settings per app 
manually, which can be very time-consuming. 
Compliance Considerations 
Technical solutions editing the code of computer 
programs may face copyright infringements [23], [24]. Apps 
and the operating system are protected under European and 
international copyright law, as long as the creation required a 
creative effort and the output is not only dependent on 
functional considerations. If there is no legitimating license 
(e.g. open source), customizing requires the permission of the 
relevant rights’ holders or an exemption by law. The European 
copyright law grants an exemption, if editing of the code is 
necessary to provide or maintain the designated use of the 
program. Legal scholars argue this should also involve the 
legal conformity of a program meaning, that apps or operating 
systems infringing data protection law could be edited by the 
users to achieve conformity with data protection obligations 
[23], [24]. The first problem is that users would have to decide 
whether a program is infringing data protection regulations or 
not. The second problem is that "designated use" is not given 
if editing or blocking data access causes impairments of the 
functionality of an app. Thus, legal uncertainty remains 
whether alterations of program code may be justified in order 
to establish data protection compliance. 
Usability Considerations 
Basic usability is often overlooked in existing privacy 
apps (see e.g. [25]). Apart from that, the usability of existing 
solutions is interlinked with the technical and legal 
considerations: most of the currently available apps that allow 
users to manage data access in more detail require a relatively 
high level of technical proficiency. Especially the more 
powerful solutions like for example XPrivacy and LBE 
Security Master require a rooted device and the installation of 
additional dependencies. These technical hurdles may prevent 
users, which would otherwise be interested in protecting their 
privacy better, to actually apply such a solution. Moreover, 
users face the risk that guarantee or warranty claims are 
rejected, if the device is rooted. From a legal point of view, 
distributers or manufacturers are not entitled to exclude 
warranty rights provided by European / German law, but can 
restrict a voluntary provided guarantee to conditions as long 
as these conditions comprise no unreasonable disadvantage to 
the customers. In judicial proceedings, it might be challenging 
to proof that the defects are not caused by the user’s software 
adaption. In case of consumer good purchases the seller / 
producer bears the burden of proof, if the defect is discovered 
within the first six month. After this period the owner of a 
rooted device would have to prove that the defect did not 
occur due to the rooting when claiming warranty. 
III. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
Our goal is to improve upon the existing solutions for 
access rights management by developing an overarching 
approach that not only provides the essential functionality, but 
also accounts for legal compliance and usability. There is a 
need for an innovative and user-friendly software application 
that prevents the exposure of personal data, enabling users to 
centrally define privacy preferences, which then are 
distributed and enforced on all devices of the user. Also, next 
to the possibility to enable fine-grained settings of the 
permissions, we need to provide functions such as 
pseudonymization or special data record filters to further 
enable the usage and control of third party applications. 
Finally, the exercise of effective, technically supported 
privacy and data protection must take also into account 
aspects of copyright, civil, criminal and public law. In the 
following, we describe the central functional (F), compliance 
(C), usability-related (U), and two additional non-functional 
(G) requirements that such a solution should fulfil. These 
requirements have been verbalised  based on an extensive 
analysis of existing solutions and current literature [20], 
including a comprehensive assessment concerning functional, 
compliance, and usability aspects: 
F-1: Data Blocking and Filtering 
A privacy solution must provide the main function to 
block or filter the data communication between operating 
system and applications, the user wants to control. Also the 
data communication between the hardware (e.g. sensors) and 
applications must be included in the blocking / filtering 
mechanism to empower the user to control the data 
communication. 
If apps react with failure to a denied data access, even if 
this blocked data is not necessary to perform the (main) 
function of the service, mechanisms are required to maintain 
the functionality. This can be achieved by providing substitute 
data. 
F-2: Ubiquity 
Entering privacy-settings once centrally for all devices 
require a method of secure distribution and actualization. To 
support the users to protect their data the privacy enhancing 
technology must be available and enforceable on all relevant 
platforms and the settings of the user must be shareable over 
different devices and platforms so that the user needs to 
configure the solution only once. 
C-1: Data security and privacy 
Storing personal data protection preferences needs to 
comply with data protection regulations. The privacy 
enhancing technology should keep privacy preferences and 
data (e.g. data that is read during the filtering mechanism) 
secret and protect these data from attackers and from central 
service providers. This is important because a privacy 
enhancing mechanism that acts as data flow control 
mechanism and with a filtering option discovers a high 
amount of personal data itself and has to store some of these 
data, too. 
C-2: No infringement of copyrights 
In order to ensure legal conformity of the conception, legal 
questions deriving from copyright, civil, criminal and public 
law have to be addressed. First, the solution should not 
infringe copyrights. In Germany there is a dispute whether an 
infringement is only given, if the code of a protected program 
is edited [26], or if a change in the program sequence can 
already comprise an infringement [27]. As the functions of a 
program are not protected under European copyright law, but 
the code as a manifestation of the creative conception, the 
latter opinion could jeopardize the possibilities of program 
interaction and interoperability [28], which are important 
objectives of European law. The system should require no 
source code modification and alterations to the program 
sequence should be limited to a minimum. 
C-3: No breach of contract 
As there is no legal obligation to provide personal data 
even in case of a business model "service in exchange for 
data" under current law, blocking data access causes no legal 
infringements. A proposal of the EU commission seeks to 
legalize contractual agreements about personal data in return 
for digital content, in case the data is provided actively [29]. 
However, this proposal conflicts with provisions of the 
upcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 
Europe. One key goal of the GDPR is to strengthen the 
voluntariness of consent in processing personal data. 
Therefore, a consent for processing data not necessary for the 
performance of a contract should be considered as invalid, if 
the consent is requested in exchange for the performance of 
the contract (Art. 7 para 4 EU 2016/679). As personal data 
give insights into the personality, human rights obstruct the 
usage of personal data as a kind of currency, product or 
property [30] In any case a contractual binding agreement to 
provide personal data in exchange for a digital service would 
require much more transparency than provided through 
privacy declarations or standard terms and conditions. 
The utilization of substitute data requires meaningful 
selection to prevent breach of contractual duties to respect 
rights and freedoms of contractual partners, tort law 
infringements or even criminal offences. In the worst case the 
usage of false data in order to achieve anonymity like a false 
name, can comprise an illegal identity fraud, if the contractual 
partner has a legally recognised interest in the true identity of 
his opponent [31]. Whether there is a "right to lie" strongly 
depends on the fact, whether the opponent infringes data 
protection law or personality rights. 
Furthermore, a misuse of the privacy application as a cheat 
software would be possible, if users had the option to choose 
ID or location data in order to pretend to be someone else or 
to have reached a certain position relevant e.g. in a game or 
employment relationship. 
Summarizing, the main requirements arising from legal 
obligations or rather to minimize legal infringements are: 
• providing substitute data only as a last resort 
• users should not be able to determine substitute data 
• substitute data comprises no information or as little 
information as possible 
• transparency towards users about usage and methods 
of generating substitute data 
• guidance for users about typical potential legal 
requirements 
Overall, the usability requirements are focusing on an easy 
to use Human Computer Interface that allows non-experts to 
easily manage their privacy settings. 
 
U-1: Simple Installation Process 
One basic requirement from the perspective of user 
experience is to keep the technical hurdles of installation and 
usage at a minimum. This is important especially with regard 
to the existing work as these solutions require the user to have 
deep technical knowledge (see section “existing solutions”). 
U-2: Understandability of Privacy Settings 
The usability of mobile privacy tools, especially the 
understandability of privacy settings, is a current research 
challenge (see e.g. [32], [33]). It has been shown, that users 
are often overwhelmed by the implications of privacy settings 
[32]. Therefore, the complexity of privacy-related decisions 
should be reduced. As a prerequisite, the development of the 
user interface should follow modern standards and best 
practices for usability. 
The following two additional non-functional requirements 
are included because we think it is important to have no 
negative impact on the "user experience" when using our 
application.  
G-1: Performance 
The privacy enhancing technology is not allowed to 
reduce the perceptible performance of the system, especially 
of the user interface of the foreground app. 
G-2: Energy consumption 
Energy consumption must not rise substantially on mobile 
devices, because battery life is limited and the user expects his 
device to run at minimum for a certain time (e.g. one day) 
without additional energy supply. 
IV. PRIVACY-AVARE 
Based on the requirements described above, we have 
developed a concept for a distributed privacy management 
solution, named PRIVACY-AVARE. In the following, we 
first refine the basic functional requirements and then describe 
a system concept that implements these refined 
functionalities. We also describe in more detail, how such a 
system can account for the defined compliance and usability 
requirements. 
A. Refined Functional Requirements 
In order to enhance privacy our software application 
PRIVACY-AVARE will have the following three essential 
functionalities: 
(1) Enter the user’s preference profile: PRIVACY-
AVARE can be used to record the user’s privacy preferences. 
The user of PRIVACY-AVARE is supported by suitable 
explanations for technical and legal laypersons. It creates a 
personal preference profile. Therefore, we need a user-
friendly comprehensive GUI and local data storage 
capabilities. 
(2) Distribute the user’s preference profile: The preference 
profile can be distributed via a central service to all devices of 
the user. In order to secure the exchange, a technical 
requirement is an end-to-end encryption. Therefore, the user 
uses a locally created key to encrypt the preferences. The key 
is distributed to other devices either by embedding into a QR 
code, displaying on the first device and photographing by the 
second one or entered manually. This means that the users 
does not have to entrust their preferences to a central service 
in plain text; the key itself is not known to the central service. 
(3) Enable the user to control data access: PRIVACY-
AVARE enables the user to allow fine-grained data access. 
Therefore, PRIVACY-AVARE has different levels of data 
access control. Data access can be blocked or filtered. 
Furthermore, PRIVACY-AVARE provides the possibility to 
use substitute data (no data or specially generated data) in case 
the app stops working otherwise. This leads to the following 
technical requirements: 
a) PRIVACY-AVARE has to monitor data access 
requests at runtime and block data flows corresponding to 
the blockage rules set by the user. 
b) PRIVACY-AVARE has to extract data as defined by 
filtering rules at runtime. 
c) PRIVACY-AVARE has to deliver substitute data to an 
application that would otherwise react with failure to a 
denied data access. Thus, PRIVACY-AVARE has to be able 
to generate plausible substitute data. 
d) PRIVACY-AVARE has to incorporate existing 
permission settings for specific applications. 
Those data flow filtering and blockage mechanisms are 
being executed during runtime. 
B. System Concept 
From the refined technical requirements, we derive the 
following architecture: Fig. 2 shows an overview of the 
operating principle. 
PRIVACY-AVARE is based on client server architecture. 
The server is responsible for storage and delivery of encrypted 
privacy profiles. The client enables the user to set his privacy 
preferences in three different levels of granularity. The 
privacy settings result in rules for data flow control. 
Furthermore, the client enforces these privacy data flow rules. 
The client’s architecture is designed independently from 
specific platforms (i.e. Android, iOS, Windows). This 
facilitates the usage of PRIVACY-AVARE on several 
terminals (Smartphones, Smart-TV, Tablets) with different 
operating systems in various versions. 
C. Client-Side Concept 
As depicted in Fig. 3, the client consists of several 
components (dark blue boxes): Component 1, the profile 
capturing-component, enables the users to set their 
preferences. Those preferences can be set either by 
application-category-level or on application-specific level. 
The profile includes preferences for specific data-categories 
such as “Files”, “Contacts” or “Location”. For each 
application-category, we propose a set of pre-defined 
preferences which the user can adopt or overwrite / change on 
the category or on application-specific level. In order to apply 
category preferences the user needs to sort his applications 
into categories. Furthermore, by transmitting the profile via a 
server to different devices, the user is able to load his profile 
and sync it. 
Component 2, the profile execution component, asserts 
the users preferences. First of all, we need a sandbox to 
securely execute third party apps within. Furthermore, we use 
a reference monitor to capture outgoing and incoming API-
calls from or to the third party apps. The reference monitor 
also executes the rules regarding vertical and horizontal 
filtering of data or the blockage of data flows. Those rules are 
extracted from the preference setting component. For 
example, the user is able to allow a specific application to get 
only a specified set of his contacts. Another example for our 
filtering approach is the obfuscation of the user’s location. The 
user is able to choose a location radius, for example 100 km. 
D. Server-Side Concept 
The server is responsible for synchronizing the privacy 
preferences of a user between his devices. Therefore, it is 
 
 
Figure 2. Operating Principle of PRIVACY-AVARE 
necessary to store the encrypted preference profile and the 
timestamp of the last change under a profile ID. The profile 
ID is generated by the server when the user logs on for the first 
time and communicated to the user device. The user device 
remembers the profile ID and creates a key for symmetric 
encryption. The device now transmits only the profile ID, the 
timestamp of the last local modification of the preference 
profile and an encrypted data block containing the preference 
profile. The key itself remains on the user's device; the server 
and its operator are not able to read these preferences and 
consequently have no knowledge of it. By this means, no 
further information is stored about the user, so the profile ID 
is a pseudonym that the server cannot resolve. 
The user can now transfer his profile ID and key to other 
devices. For this purpose, this information is embedded in a 
QR code and displayed on the display. This QR code can be 
read with another device. This other device can now log on to 
the PRIVACY-AVARE server and retrieve the encrypted 
stored preference profile. With the locally available key, the 
profile can be decrypted and transferred to PRIVACY-
AVARE. Regardless of which device the user takes to make 
changes to his preferences, they are copied to the server in 
encrypted form and can be retrieved from the other devices 
from there. For this purpose, all devices regularly check with 
the PRIVACY-AVARE server, if there are newer settings and 
download them if necessary. 
In order to store as little information as possible on the 
PRIVACY-AVARE server (data minimization), no 
information about the devices used is collected. This way, the 
profile is only encrypted as a whole. Storing the profile in 
several individually encrypted parts (e.g. separated by 
category) could reduce the amount of data to be synchronized, 
but would reveal more information about a user to the 
PRIVACY-AVARE server. Even though little critical 
information is transmitted in plain text, the connection 
between server and devices is additionally secured with 
transport encryption. 
Users can stop synchronization on one or all of their 
devices at any time. They can also delete all of their data 
(profile, timestamp) from the PRIVACY-AVARE server. In 
addition, there will be a clean-up process that deletes outdated 
profiles that had no contact with a device for more than 
18 months from the PRIVACY-AVARE server. If a user logs 
back to the server after the end of this period, his profile and 
ID are restored from his local data. 
E. Compliance 
As it should not be the obligation of the user to decide on 
complex legal questions, our concept is based on escalation 
 
Figure 3. Overview of PRIVACY-AVARE client 
steps minimizing potential infringements. Only if the blocking 
of data access leads to a loss in functionality of the app, empty 
data is provided (like an empty address book and calendar, no 
sound, …), so that the opponent cannot learn anything 
(wrong) from such data. If the app detects this protective 
measure, substitute data consisting of publicly available 
information is provided, in order to reveal no personal 
information about the user or third users and meanwhile 
reduce potential damages due to false data. Replacement data 
could be e.g. public holidays (calendar), public authorities / 
companies (address book), background noise (microphone), 
image noise (camera). Special cases are location data and IDs, 
as providing false location data could also lead to negative 
consequences for other users, e.g. when data is used by the 
app provider for traffic jam prediction. 
F. Categorization 
One usability-related goal of PRIVACY-AVARE is to 
reduce complexity for the user, while still providing the 
capabilities to effectively enforce privacy preferences. With 
PRIVACY-AVARE, we aim to support the users in their 
decisions, by providing recommendations for app categories 
based on expert judgements. This way, our solution can 
provide the additional benefit of teaching the user about 
potential privacy threats and sensible settings. The idea is to 
categorize apps into groups with similar functionality. A 
category captures various applications with similar 
functionalities. For example, one category consists of 
applications providing navigation functionality. Each 
category shares a specific set of data usage permissions. The 
category navigation, for example, needs the location of the 
user. Suitable permission sets for common categories of 
applications are provided and set by default but can also be 
adapted individually by the user. This bears two advantages: 
First, the user does not have to think about every single app, 
but can apply her or his privacy preferences once for each 
category. Second, PRIVACY-AVARE can give 
recommendations for privacy settings to further support the 
user. This even opens up the possibility to teach useful settings 
corresponding to app functionality and possible privacy risks. 
In the following, we describe our approach to the initial 
categorization: 
As a first step, the relevant kinds of personal data that are 
stored on a mobile device were identified. Based on the 
Android permission system, we identified 10 potentially 
critical ways for apps to access personal data (Camera & 
Microphone, Location, Sensors, Phone Calls and SMS, 
Contacts, Calendar, Accounts, Files, Identity and Messages) 
and additionally three ways for apps to transfer personal data 
(via Internet Access, Bluetooth or NFC). 
In a second step, the identified data access / transfer 
possibilities were mapped to application-categories. These 
categories were initially compiled from the existing categories 
in the Android and iOS app stores. For each application-
category and data access / transfer possibility, PRIVACY-
AVARE provides a recommendation, whether access should 
be prohibited, allowed or filtered. To achieve this, results from 
a user survey (with 14 participants) and judgments from 
experts (6 participants of the IT security and privacy projects) 
have been aggregated and served as a basis for discussion and 
consensus finding between the authors of this paper. On the 
basis of this consensus, categories with similar profiles have 
been combined to a total number of 11 app categories. 
V. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
A. Technical Limitations (see F-1 to F-2) 
From a conceptual point of view the presented privacy 
enhancing approach PRIVACY-AVARE fulfils the above 
presented requirements. Data blocking, filtering and 
providing substitute data will be achieved by the reference 
monitor, while the specific implementation will vary 
according to the operating systems versions. As existing API 
are used and no manipulation of the code is required, an 
infringement of copyright is not expected - an advantage over 
existing access rights management approaches (see page 2). 
The possibilities to block all categories of data, filter data 
vertically and horizontally and provide substitute data if 
necessary comprise essential improvements in comparison to 
the functionalities provided by Android (from Version 6) and 
iOS. As this implies the selection of several possible settings, 
usability is enhanced by categorization, default settings and 
comprehensible guidance. Rooting of the device is not 
required so that the installation process is manageable for 
technical laypersons and guarantee or warranty rights are not 
at risk. Due to the architecture concept ubiquity and data 
protection are achieved. The reduction of processed personal 
data to an essential minimum and the use of encryption for 
storage and distribution over the internet already complies 
with the requirements of privacy by design and data security 
placed by the upcoming GDPR. 
One technical challenge for the profile execution 
component is an implementation-based challenge. Each 
Operating System offers different technical implementation 
regarding security and communication aspects. Furthermore, 
the Android platform can vary its concrete communication 
implementation on a version-based level. Therefore, we have 
to consider those variations for the profile execution 
component in order to be able to catch an applications API 
call. This leads to different, version-specific implementations 
of the profile execution component. As there are currently 
several different Android Versions available, in use and 
constantly evolving we focus on Android 6 and Android 7. 
The implementation on each version varies cause of different 
implementation of the sandbox mechanism, but several codes 
can be shared (e.g. for filtering data, for generating smart 
blurred position data). 
B. Compliance Limitations (see C-1 to C-3) 
Although we tried to minimize the risk for data security 
and privacy threats by technical means such as using transport 
encryption during server and client communication, a residual 
risk remains. 
By careful selection of substitute data, legal infringements 
are minimized. But as various constellations are hardly 
predictable, legal conformity will not be achievable 
completely without the participation of the user. PRIVACY-
AVARE cannot react automatically e.g. to a change of 
purpose of data processing by an application which might lead 
to a different consideration concerning the possibilities to 
provide substitute data. One approach could be the automated 
analysis of data protection declarations or terms and 
conditions. Currently, the information provided in these 
declarations is mostly too vague to draw clear and 
unambiguous conclusions. Therefore, we support the user by 
providing explanatory symbols and texts, specific to the 
category. 
Regarding user IDs the challenge is to identify cases where 
a wrong ID might cause legal consequences and to provide 
false IDs which are not linked to another person. 
C. Usability Limitations (see U-1 to U-2) 
In order to use PRIVACY-AVARE, the users are not 
required to root their device or to install additional 
dependencies in advance. 
Regarding our approach to reduce complexity for the user 
via pre-defined categories, there is a risk that the categories do 
not capture all relevant kinds of apps and privacy settings. 
Still, for the categories to support the users in their decisions, 
it is important to find a balance between specificity of the 
categories and the total number of categories. A too high 
number of categories would jeopardize the goal of reduced 
complexity. We intend to address this risk by allowing the 
users to create their own categories. It would also be possible 
to integrate further mechanisms to support the user in properly 
categorizing the apps. For example, Liu et al. [33] propose a 
system that recommends predefined setting profiles to the 
user, based on some initial questions. Oglaza et al. [34] 
propose a self-learning system that learns from the user’s 
previous decisions to recommend high-level rules. However, 
this implies that the privacy protecting application likewise 
needs to process personal data and discover personal 
preferences. 
In order to ensure an easy to use interface we also have 
iterative usability tests for our prototype. These are intended 
to identify and address possible usability issues early on 
during development. 
D. Limitations to general requirements (see G-1 to G-2) 
Enhancing privacy by a sandboxing and data flow control 
solution with e.g. filtering mechanism can’t be done without 
additional processing and memory effort at runtime. 
Therefore the implementation reduces performance and 
enlarges energy consumption. It is only possible to keep the 
additional effort at a level that does not matter for normal and 
high-end devices. But for devices with low resources the 
implementation could have an annoying effect. 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we describe a privacy enhancing approach 
respecting functional, legal and usability requirements to 
enforce the users’ privacy preferences centrally on all their 
devices. The application PRIVACY-AVARE enables the user 
to define individual privacy settings once and enforce these 
preferences on all devices by blocking or filtering data access 
in the first step. If a monitored app reacts with denial of service 
PRIVACY-AVARE provides empty, blurred or substitute 
data in the last step. The selection and range of substitute data 
is limited due to legal considerations and accompanied by 
explanatory guidance. This interdisciplinary approach ensures 
the practical applicability of the technical solutions. By using 
a reference monitor along with sandboxes to restrict data 
access copyrights should not be affected. The distribution of 
privacy settings is encrypted to preclude additional privacy 
risks. The effort to select privacy settings is manageable for 
laypersons due to prior categorization and default settings. 
Currently, we are working on a prototypical implementation 
for Android devices. For the future, we are planning more 
iterative usability tests to further enhance the usability and the 
integration of different kind of devices like Smart Home 
devices. 
We will publish the code as open source (under the apache 
2.0 licence) until April 2018 on GitHub 
(https://github.com/fzi-forschungszentrum-
informatik/PRIVACY-AVARE) and are working on building 
a community for the further improvement and development of 
PRIVACY-AVARE. 
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Informational Self-Determination
general right of personality is provided by
 the protection of human dignity - Art.1(1) 
Grundgesetz
 the protection of general personal liberty
- Art. 2(1) Grundgesetz
„general right of personality […] guarantees each 
individual the possibility to develop his/her own 
personality.“
In 1984 „the Bundesverfassungsgericht ‚invented‘ the new 
basic right of informational self-determination“
 based on the general right of personality
informational self-determination is – in Germany – the 
constitutional  anchor for data protection
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source / see also: G. Hornung und C. Schnabel, „Data protection in Germany I: The population census decision and the right to 
informational self-determination“, Computer Law & Security Review, 25(1), p. 84–88, Jan. 2009.
Chief Aim of Data Protection
 not about protecting data
 but about protecting each natural person
 natural persons right to the protection of their personal 
data
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Privacy Paradoxon
high value of privacy
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usage of apps, services, …
Privacy Paradoxon
high value of privacy
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usage of apps, services, …
Intent: Use applications in such a way, 
that no or only ‘little’ data about the user 
itself and friends/acquaintances 
becomes known.
Existing Solutions








operating system operating system
application
sandbox library
manifest modification library injection into app operation system modification
Existing Solutions
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Functional Requirements
 Data Blocking and Filtering 
 block data that the user not wants to share with a app / service
 filter data if the user wants to share specific data
 E.g. only share name and telephone number with a 
communication app.
 fall back: substitute data
 Ubiquity
 Unique formalisation of preferences
 Synchronization of preferences across all platforms and devices 
of a user
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Compliance Requirements
 Data security and privacy
 Preference profile is stored and synchronized in such a way that 
no third party is aware of it
 Also data the PRIVACY-AVARE reads e. g. in the context of 
filtering are protected
 No infringement of copyrights
 PRIVACY-AVARE must respect the rights of other developers
 Foreign code as a manifestation of a creative conception is not 
manipulated
 Alternations to the program sequence should be limited to a 
minimum
 No breach of contract
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Usability & User Experience (UUX)
 Simple Installation Process
 PRIVACY-AVARE is also for end users without deep technical 
knowledge
 Installation by end user without root privileges
 Understandability of Privacy Settings
 User must be able to formalise his own preferences
 User interface should follow common and modern standards
 User interface should reduce the complexity of privacy settings
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PRIVACY - AVARE
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PRIVACY - AVARE






other serv ices and applications
sandbox
server
component 2: runtime component
component 1:
user interface and distribution
settings manager
Conclusion
 Development of PRIVACY-AVARE Solution is platform specific.
 Even minor version updates changes the possibilities
 Problem: Developer uses techniques that hackers use for exploits
 PRIVACY-AVARE as …
 … as a standardized description of preferences
 … as UI with a good end user experience
 … as tool for synchronization between devices
 platform-specific enhancement tools 
OR 
 operation system APIs to enhance fine granular preferences
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